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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The last two centuries have been characterized by a great divergence in income per capita across
the globe. The ratio of GDP per capita between the richest and the poorest regions of the
world has widened considerably from a modest 3 to 1 ratio in 1820 to an 18 to 1 ratio in 2001
(Maddison, 2001).1 The role of geographical and institutional factors, human capital formation,
ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization, colonialism and globalization has been the center
of a debate about the origin of the diﬀerential timing of the transition from stagnation to growth
and the remarkable change in the world income distribution.
This paper argues that inequality in the distribution of land ownership, adversely aﬀected
the emergence of human capital promoting institutions (public schooling and child labor regula-
tions) and thus the pace and the nature of the transition from an agricultural to an industrial
economy, contributing to the emergence of the great divergence in income per capita across coun-
tries.2 The theory further suggests that some land abundant countries that were characterized
by an unequal distribution of land, were overtaken in the process of industrialization by land
scarce countries in which land distribution was rather equal.
The transition from an agricultural economy to an industrial economy has changed the
nature of the main economic conﬂict in society. Unlike the agrarian economy which was char-
acterized by a conﬂict of interest between the landed aristocracy and the masses, the process
of industrialization has shifted the conﬂict towards a dispute between the entrenched landed
aristocratic elite and the emerging capitalists elite.3 The capitalists who were striving for an
educated labor force had interest in policies that promoted the education of the masses, whereas
the landowners whose interest lied in the reduction of the potential mobility of the rural labor
force, favored policies that deprived the masses from education.4
The process of development and industrialization raised the importance of human capital,
1Some researchers (e.g., Jones, 1997 and Pritchett, 1997) have demonstrated that this diverging pattern persisted
in the last decades as well. Interestingly, however, as established by Sala-i-Martin (2006), the phenomena has not
been maintained across people in the world (i.e., when national boundaries are removed).
2Most of the existing studies (e.g., Hall and Jones, 1999), attribute the diﬀerences in income per-capita across
countries largely to diﬀerences in TFP, whereas some (e.g., Manuali and Seshadri, 2005) provide evidence in favor
of the dominating role of human capital. Nevertheless, it should be noted that even if the direct role of human
capital is limited, as established by Glaeser et al. (2004), it has a large indirect eﬀect on growth via its eﬀect on
technological progress and the implementation of growth enhancing institution.
3One may view the civil war in the US as a struggle between the industrialists in the north who were striving
for a large supply of (educated) workers, and the landowners in the south that wanted to sustained the existing
system and to assure the existence of a large supply of cheap (uneducated) labor. In particular, Bowles (1978)
discusses the incentives of landlords to restrict access to education in order to preserve a relatively cheap labor
force.
4“In reality that law reveals the disinterest in rural education, a disinterest based on.... essentially an agrarian
structure, inherited from the colonial period. The perpetuation of rural illiteracy is one of the elements that
permits the conservation of a traditional rural society. It slows horizontal movement (rural to urban) and vertical
movement (aspirations for land reform),” (Ivon Lebot (1972) in his reﬂection about the education law passed in
1903 in Colombia, quoted in Hanson (1986)).
1reﬂecting the complementarity of physical capital and technology to human capital. Investment
in human capital, however, has been sub-optimal due to credit markets imperfections, and pub-
lic investment in education has been therefore growth enhancing.5 Nevertheless, human capital
accumulation has not beneﬁted all sectors of the economy. Due to a lower degree of complemen-
tarity between human capital and land,6 a rise in the level of education would have increased the
productivity of labor in industrial production more than in agriculture, decreasing the return to
land due to labor migration, and the associated rise in wages. Landowners, therefore, had no
economic incentives to support these growth enhancing educational policies as long as their stake
in the productivity of the industrial sector was insuﬃcient.7
The theory suggests that the adverse eﬀect of the implementation of public education
on landowners’ income from agricultural production is magniﬁed by the concentration of land
ownership.8 Hence, as long as landowners have aﬀected the political process and thereby the
implementation of education reforms, inequality in the distribution of land ownership has been
a hurdle for human capital accumulation, slowing the process of industrialization and the tran-
sition to modern growth.9 In economies characterized by concentration of land ownership, an
ineﬃcient education policy persisted and the growth path was retarded. In contrast, in societies
in which land ownership was distributed rather equally, growth enhancing education policies were
implemented at earlier stages, positively aﬀecting the process of development.10
The process of industrialization and the accumulation of physical capital by landowners
5See Galor and Zeira (1993), Fernandez and Rogerson (1996), and Benabou (2000).
6Although, rapid technological change in the agricultural sector may increase the return to human capital (e.g.,
Foster and Rosenzweig, 1996), the return to education is typically lower in the agricultural sector, as evident by
the distribution of employment in the agricultural sector. For instance, as reported by the U.S. department of
Agriculture (1998), 56.9% of agricultural employment consists of high school dropouts, in contrast to an average
of 13.7% in the economy as a whole. Similarly, 16.6% of agricultural employment consists of workers with 13 or
more years of schooling, in contrast to an average of 54.5% in the economy as a whole.
7Landowners, as well as other owners of factors of production, inﬂuence the level of public schooling but are
limited in their power to levy taxes for their own beneﬁt. Otherwise, following the Coasian Theorem, the landed
elite would prefer an optimal level of education, taxing the resulting increase in aggregate income. Nevertheless,
landowners may beneﬁt from the economic development of other segments of the economy due to capital ownership,
household’s labor supply to the industrial sector, the provision of public goods, and demand spillover from economic
development of the urban sector.
8The proposed mechanism focuses on the emergence of public education. Alternatively, one could have focused
on child labor regulation, linking it to human capital formation as in Doepke and Zilibotti (2003), or on the
endogenous abolishment of slavery (e.g., Lagerlof, 2003) and the incentives it creates for investment in human
capital.
9Consistently with the proposed theory, Deininger and Squire (1998) document that the level of education and
economic growth over the period 1960-1992 are inversely related to land inequality (across landowners) and the
relationship is more pronounced in developing countries.
10The adverse relationship between natural resources and growth is documented even in smaller time frames.
Sachs and Warner (1995) and Gylfason (2001) document a signiﬁcant inverse relationship between natural resources
and growth in the post World-War II era. Gylfason ﬁnds that a 10% increase in the amount of natural capital
is associated with a fall of about 1% in the growth rate. Furthermore, based on a cross section study, he reports
signiﬁcant negative relationships between the share of natural capital in national wealth, and public spending on
education, expected years of schooling, and secondary-school enrollments, concluding that natural resources crowd
out human capital formation.
2have raised their interest in the productivity of the industrial sector. Ultimately, a qualitative
change in landowners’ attitudes towards education reforms took place allowing for the implemen-
tation of eﬃcient human capital promoting institutions.11 In particular, economies in which land
was rather equally distributed, implemented earlier public education, leading to the emergence
of a skill-intensive industrial sector and a rapid process of development. In contrast, among
economies marked by an unequal distribution of land ownership, land abundance that was a
source of richness in early stages of development, led, in later stages, to under-investment in
human capital, an unskilled-intensive industrial sector, and a slower growth process.12 Thus,
variations in the distribution of land ownership across countries generated variations in the in-
dustrial composition of the economy, and thereby the observed diverging growth patterns across
the globe.13
The predictions of the theory regarding the adverse eﬀect of the concentration of land
ownership on the implementation of education reforms is examined empirically based on cross-
state data from the beginning of the 20th century in the US. Variations in public spending on
education across states in the US during the high school movement are utilized in order to examine
the thesis that land inequality was a hurdle for public investment in human capital. In addition,
historical evidence surveyed in section 3 suggests that indeed the distribution of land ownership
aﬀected the nature of the transition from an agrarian to an industrial economy and has been
signiﬁcant in the emergence of sustained diﬀerences in human capital and growth patterns across
countries.
2 Related Literature
The central role of human capital formation in the transition from stagnation to growth is un-
derlined in uniﬁed growth theory (Galor, 2005). This research establishes theoretically (Galor
and Weil, 2000, Galor and Moav, 2002) and quantitatively (Doepke, 2004, Fernandez-Villaverde,
11The proposed theory relies on the diminishing importance of land rents for the income of the economy over
time, in accordance with the long run trend in developed countries. For the United Kingdom, Lindert (1986)
documents that the share of land rent in national income in 1867 was 5%, falling to less than 0.5% in 1972-73. A
similar pattern is found for the United States, where in 1900 the share of national income going to rent was 9.1%,
by 1930 was 6.6%, and by 2005 was 0.7%. (The 1900 ﬁgure is from the U.S. Historical Statistics, series F186-191.
The 1930 and 2005 ﬁgures are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.) Even if all proprietor’s income from farms
is additionally assumed to be a factor payment to land, the share of national income in 1930 is 11% and in 2005
is only 0.9%. Under either assumption the share of land rents in national income is approaching zero over time.
12According to the theory, therefore, land reform would bring about an increase in the investment in human
capital. The diﬀerential increase in the productivity of workers in the industrial and the agricultural sectors would
generate migration from the agricultural to the industrial sector accompanied by an increase in agricultural wages
and a decline in agricultural employment. Consistent with the proposed theory, Besley and Burgess (2000) ﬁnd
that over the period 1958-1992 in India, land reforms have raised agricultural wages, despite an adverse eﬀect on
agricultural output.
13As established by Chanda and Dalgaard (2003), variations in the structural composition of economies and in
particular the allocation of scarce inputs between the agriculture and the non-agriculture sectors are important
determinants of international diﬀerences in TFP, accounting for between 30 and 50 percents of these variations.
32005, and Lagerlof, 2006) that the rise in the demand for human capital in the process of in-
dustrialization and its eﬀect on human capital formation, technological progress, and the onset
of the demographic transition, have been the prime forces in the transition from stagnation to
growth. As the demand for human capital emerged, variations in the extensiveness of human
capital formation and therefore in the rapidity of technological progress and the timing of the
demographic transition, signiﬁcantly aﬀected the distribution of income in the world economy.
The proposed theory suggests that the concentration of land ownership has been a major
hurdle in the emergence of human capital promoting institutions. Thus the observed variations
in human capital formation and in the emergence of divergence and overtaking in economic
performance, is attributed to the historical diﬀerences in the distribution of land ownership across
countries. The predictions of the theory are consistent with earlier ﬁndings about the inverse
r e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e nl a n di n e q u a l i t ya n dh u m a nc apital formation across countries (Deininger
and Squire, (1998)) and with our ﬁndings that land inequality had a signiﬁcant adverse eﬀect on
education expenditure in the US.
The role of institutional factors has been the focus of an alternative hypothesis regarding
the origin of the great divergence. North (1981), Landes (1998), Mokyr (1990, 2002), Parente and
Prescott (2000), and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) have argued that institutions that
facilitated the protection of property rights, enhancing technological research and the diﬀusion of
knowledge, have been the prime factor that enabled the earlier European take-oﬀ and the great
technological divergence across the globe.14
The eﬀect of geographical factors on economic growth and the great divergence have been
emphasized by Jones (1981), Diamond (1997) and Sachs and Werner (1995).15 The geographical
hypothesis suggests that favorable geographical conditions made Europe less vulnerable to the
risk associated with climate and diseases, leading to the early European take-oﬀ, whereas adverse
geographical conditions in disadvantageous regions, generated permanent hurdles for the process
of development, contributing to the great divergence.16
The exogenous nature of the geographical factors and the inherent endogeneity of the
institutional factors lead researchers to hypothesize that initial geographical conditions had a
persistent eﬀect on the quality of institutions, leading to divergence and overtaking in economic
performance.17 Engerman and Sokolof (2000) - ES - provide descriptive evidence that geographi-
14Divergence could also emerge from diﬀerences in legal origins (Gleaser and Shleifer, 2002). Barriers to tech-
nological adoption that may lead to divergence are explored by Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) and Acemoglu,
Aghion and Zilibotti (2006).
15See Hall and Jones (1999), Masters and McMillan (2001) and Hibbs and Olson (2004) as well.
16Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2003) reject, in a cross section analysis, the geographical determinism, but main-
tain nevertheless that favorable geographical conditions have mattered for economic growth since they increased
the likelihood of an economy to escape a poverty trap.
17The role of ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization in the emergence of divergence and “growth
tragedies” has been linked to their eﬀect on the quality of institutions (Easterly and Levine, 1997).
4cal conditions that led to income inequality, brought about oppressive institutions (e.g., restricted
access to the democratic process and to education) designed to maintain the political power of the
elite and to preserve the existing inequality, whereas geographical characteristics that generated
an equal distribution of income led to the emergence of growth promoting institutions. Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson (2002) - AJR - provide evidence that reversals in economic performance
across countries have a colonial origin, reﬂecting institutional reversals that were introduced by
European colonialism across the globe.18 “Reversals of fortune” reﬂect the imposition of extrac-
tive institutions by the European colonialists in regions where favorable geographical conditions
led to prosperity, and the implementation of growth enhancing institutions in poorer regions.19
The proposed theory diﬀers in several important dimensions from the earlier analysis of
the relationship between geographically factors, inequality, and institutions. First, the theory
suggests that a conﬂict of interest among the economic elites i.e., industrialists and landowners
(rather than between the ruling elite and the masses as argued by ES and AJR) brought about the
delay in the implementation of growth enhancing educational policies. Hence, in contrast to the
viewpoint of ES and AJR about the persistent desirability of extractive institutions for the ruling
elite, the proposed theory suggests that the implementation of growth promoting institutions
emerges in the process of development as the economic interest of the industrialists dominates.
Second, consistent with existing cross sectional evidence, the theory underlines the adverse eﬀect
of unequal distribution of land ownership (rather than wealth inequality as suggested by ES)
in the timing of educational reforms. Moreover, the paper establishes empirically that land
inequality had a major eﬀect on education reforms in the US whereas wealth inequality has
only a secondary eﬀect. Third, the theory focuses on the direct economic incentive (i.e., the
adverse eﬀect of education reforms on the land rental rate) that induces the landed elite to block
education reforms, rather than on the eﬀect of political reforms on the distribution of political
power and thus the degree of rent extraction. Hence, unlike ES, and AJR, even if the political
structure remains unchanged, economic development ultimately triggers the implementation of
growth promoting institutions.20
A complementary approach suggests that interest groups (e.g., landed aristocracy and
monopolies) block the introduction of new technologies and superior institutions in order to
protect their political power and thus maintain their rent extraction. Olson (1982), Mokyr (1990),
18Additional aspects of the role of colonialism in comparative developments are analyzed by Bertocchi and
Canova (2002).
19Brezis, Krugman and Tsiddon (1993), in contrast, attribute technological leapfrogging to the acquired compar-
ative advantage (via learning by doing) of the current technological leaders in the use of the existing technologies.
20In contrast to the political economy mechanism proposed by Persson and Tabellini (2000), where land concen-
tration induces landowners to divert resources in their favor via distortionary taxation, in the proposed theory land
concentration induces lower taxation so as to assure lower public expenditure on education, resulting in a lower
economic growth. The proposed theory is therefore consistent with empirical ﬁndings that taxation is positively
related to economic growth and negatively to inequality (e.g., Benabou, 1996 and Perotti, 1996).
5Parente and Prescott (2000), and Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) argue that this type of conﬂict,
in the context of technology adoption, has played an important role throughout the evolution of
industrial societies.21 Interestingly, the political economy interpretation of our theory suggests,
in contrast, that the industrial elite would relinquish power to the masses in order to overcome
the desire of the landed elite to block economic development.22
Empirical research is inconclusive about the signiﬁcance of human capital rather than insti-
tutional factors in the process of development. Some researchers suggest that initial geographical
conditions aﬀected the current economic performance primarily via their eﬀect on institutions.
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002), Easterly and Levine (2003), and Rodrik, Subramanian
and Trebbi (2004) provide evidence that variations in the contemporary growth processes across
countries can be attributed to institutional factors whereas geographical factors are secondary,
operating primarily via variations in institutions. Moreover, Easterly and Levine (1997) and
Alesina et al. (2003) demonstrate that geopolitical factors brought about a high degree of frac-
tionalization in some regions of the world, leading to the implementation of institutions that are
not conducive for economic growth and thereby to diverging growth paths across regions.
Glaeser et al. (2004) revisit the debate whether political institutions cause economic
growth, or whether, alternatively, growth and human capital accumulation lead to institutional
improvement. In contrast to earlier studies, they ﬁnd that human capital is a more fundamental
source of growth than political institutions (i.e., risk of expropriation by the government, govern-
ment eﬀectiveness, and constraints on the executives). Moreover, they argue that poor countries
emerge from poverty through good policies (e.g., human capital promoting policies) and only
subsequently improve their political institutions.
Finally, the paper contributes to the political economy approach to the relationship between
inequality, redistribution and economic growth. This literature argued initially that inequality
generates political pressure to adopt redistributive policies, and that the distortionary taxation
that is associated with these policies adversely aﬀects investment and economic growth (Alesina
and Rodrik, 1994 and Persson and Tabellini, 1994). Existing evidence, however, do not sup-
port either of the two underlying mechanisms (Perotti, 1996). In contrast, the proposed theory
suggests that inequality (in the distribution of land ownership) is in fact a barrier for redistribu-
tion and growth promoting educational policy, provided that land owners have suﬃcient political
power. This mechanism resembles the one advanced by Benabou (2000) in his exploration of
the relationship between redistribution and growth.23 He demonstrates that a country would
implement an eﬃcient tax policy and converge to a higher income steady-state provided that the
21Barriers to technological adoption that may lead to divergence are explored by Caselli and Coleman (2002),
Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) and Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006) as well.
22See Lizzeri and Persico (2004) and Ghosal and Proto (2005) as well.
23See also Benabou (2002) for the trade-oﬀs between redistribution and economic growth.
6initial level of inequality is low and that the better endowed agents have therefore limited interest
to lobby against it.24 Otherwise the eﬃcient redistribution will be blocked, perpetuating initial
inequality and conﬁning the economy to a low-income steady-state.25
3 Historical Evidence
Historical evidence suggests that indeed the distribution of land ownership has been a signiﬁcant
force in the emergence of sustained diﬀerences in human capital formation and growth patterns
across countries.
3.1 Land Ownership and the Level of Education
Anecdotal Evidence suggests that the degree of concentration of land ownership across countries
and regions are inversely related to education expenditure and attainment. North and South
America provide the most distinctive set of suggestive evidence about the relationship between
the distribution of land ownership, education reforms, and the process of development. The
original colonies in North and South America had a vast amount of land per person and levels
of income per capita that were comparable to the Western European ones. North and Latin
America, however, diﬀered in the distribution of land and resources. While the United States
and Canada have been characterized by a relatively egalitarian distribution of land ownership,
in the rest of the new world land and resources have been persistently concentrated in the hand
of the elite (Deininger and Squire, 1998).
Consistent with the proposed theory, the persistent diﬀerences in the distribution of land
ownership between North and Latin America were associated with signiﬁcant divergence in edu-
cation and income levels across these regions (Maddison, 2001). Although all of the economies in
the western hemisphere were developed enough in the early 19th century to justify investment in
primary schools, only the United States and Canada were engaged in the education of the general
population (Coatsworth, 1993, and Engerman and Sokoloﬀ, 2000).
Variations in the degree of inequality in the distribution of land ownership among Latin
American countries were reﬂected in variation in investment in human capital as well. In par-
ticular, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay in which land inequality was less pronounced invested
signiﬁcantly more in education (Engerman and Sokolof, 2000). Similarly, Nugent and Robinson
(2002) show that in Costa Rica and Colombia where coﬀee is typically grown in small farms (re-
ﬂecting lower inequality in the distribution of land) income and human capital are signiﬁcantly
24This mechanism is echoed in Gardstein (2006) that argues that the support for the protection of property
rights is greater the more equal income distribution and the smaller is the political bias.
25Similarly, Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) suggest that if political participation is determined by the education
(socioeconomic status) of citizens, the elite may not ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to subsidize universal public education despite
the existence of positive externalities from human capital.
7higher than that of Guatemala and El Salvador, where coﬀee plantations are rather large.26
Moreover, one of the principles championed by the progressives during the Mexican Revolution
of 1910 was compulsory, free public education. However, the achievement of this goal varied
greatly by state. In the north, with a relatively more equitable land distribution, enrollment in
public schools increased rapidly as industrialization advanced following the revolution. This is
in contrast to the southern states, which were dominated by the haciendas who employed essen-
tially slave labor. In these states there was virtually no increase in school enrollment following
the revolution (Vaughan, 1982). Similarly, rural education in Brazil lagged due to the immense
political power of the local landlords. Hence, in 1950, thirty years after the Brazilian government
had instituted an education reform, nearly 75% of the nation was still illiterate (Bonilla, 1965).
3.2 Land Reforms and Subsequent Education Reforms
Evidence from Japan, Korea, Russia, and Taiwan indicates that land reforms were followed by
signiﬁcant education reforms. There are two interpretations for those historical episodes in which
l a n dr e f o r m si sf o l l o w e db ye d u c a t i o nr e f o r m s . F irst, land reforms may diminish the economic
incentives of landowners to block education reforms. Second, the feasibility of land reforms is
indicative of the political weakness of the landed aristocracy that prevents them from blocking
growth enhancing education reforms. Both interpretations are consistent with the theory regard-
ing the adverse eﬀect of the concentration of land ownership on education reforms. The former,
directly via the proposed economic mechanism, and the later indirectly via a political mechanism
in which, given the conﬂict of economic interest between the landowners and capitalists, the
degree of implementation of education reforms is an outcome of the balance of power in society.
3.2.1 Japan and the Meiji Restoration
Towards the end of Tokugawa regime (1600- 1867), although the level of education in Japan was
impressive for its time, the provision of education was sporadic and had no central control or
funding, reﬂecting partly the resistance of the landholding military class for education reforms
(Gubbins, 1973). The opportunity to modernize the education system arrived with the overthrow
of the traditional feudal structure shortly after the Meiji Restoration of 1868. In 1871, an Imperial
Decree initiated the abolishment of the feudal system. In a sequence of legislation in the period
1871-1883, decisions on land utilization and choice of crops were transferred to farmers from
their landlords, prohibitions on the sale and mortgage of farmland were removed, a title of
ownership was granted to the legal owners of the land, and communal pasture and forest land was
26In contrast to the proposed theory, Nugent and Robinson (2002) suggest that a holdup problem generated by
the monopsony power in large plantations prevents commitment to reward investment in human capital, whereas
small holders can capture the reward to human capital and have therefore the incentive to invest. This mechanism
does not generate the economic forces that permit the economy to escape this institutional trap.
8transferred from the ownership of wealthy landlords to the ownership of the central government.
This legislations resulted in the distribution of land holdings among small family farms, which
persisted until the rise of a new landlord system during the 1930’s (Hayami, 1975, chapter 3).
Consistent with the proposed theory, the process of education reform followed rapidly the
process of land reform. In 1872 the Educational Code established compulsory and locally funded
education for all children between ages 6 and 14 (Gubbins, 1973, chapter 30). In addition, a
secondary school and university system was funded by the central government. The Education
Code of 1872, was reﬁned in 1879 and 1886, setting the foundations for the structure of Japanese
education until World War II. The progress in education attainment following the land reforms of
the Meiji government was substantial. While in 1873 only 28% of school-age children attended
schools, this ratio increased to 51% by 1883 and to 94% by 1903 (Passin, 1965).
3.2.2 Russia before the Revolution
Education in Tsarist Russia lagged well behind comparable European countries at the close
of the 19th century. Provincial councils dominated by wealthier landowners, were responsible
for their local school systems and were reluctant to favor education for the peasants (Johnson,
1969). Literacy rates in the rural areas were a mere 21% in 1896, and the urban literacy rate
was only 56%. As the Tsar’s grip on power weakened during the early 1900’s the political
power of the wealthy landowners gradually declined leading to a sequence of agrarian reforms
that were initiated by the premier Stolypin in 1906. Restrictions on mobility of peasants were
abolished, fragmented landholdings were consolidated, and the formation of individually owned
farms was encouraged and supported through the provision of government credit. Stolypin’s
reforms accelerated the redistribution of land to individual farmers and landholdings of the landed
aristocracy declined from about 35-45% in 1860 to 17% in 1917. (Florinsky, 1961).
Consistent with the proposed theory, following the agrarian reforms and the declining
inﬂuence of the landed aristocracy, the provision of compulsory elementary education had been
proposed. The initial eﬀort of 1906 languished, but the newly created representative Duma
continued to pressure the government to provide free compulsory education. In the period
1908-1912, the Duma approved a sequence of a signiﬁcant increase in expenditures for education
(Johnson, 1969). The share of the Provincial council’s budget that was allocated to education
increased from 20.4% in 1905 to 31.1% in 1914 (Johnson, 1969), the share of the central
government’s budget that was devoted to the Ministry of Public Education increased three-fold
from 1.4% in 1906 to 4.9% in 1915, and the share of the entire population that was actively
attending schools increased 3-fold from 1.7% in 1897 to 5.7% in 1915 (Dennis, 1961).
93.2.3 South Korea and Taiwan
The process of development in Korea was marked by a major land reform followed by a massive
increase in governmental expenditure on education. During the Japanese occupation in the pe-
riod 1905-1945, land distribution in Korea became increasingly skewed and in 1945 nearly 70%
of Korean farming households were simply tenants (Eckert, 1990). In 1948-1950, the Repub-
lic of Korea instituted the Agricultural Land Reform Amendment Act that drastically aﬀected
landholdings.27 The principle of land reform was enshrined in the constitution of 1948 and the
actual implementation of the Agricultural Land Reform Amendment Act began on March 10th,
1950.28 This act prohibited tenancy and land renting, put a maximum on the amount of land any
individual could own, and dictated that an individual could only own land if they actually cul-
tivated it. Owner cultivated farm households increased 6-fold from 349,000 in 1949 to 1,812,000
in 1950, and tenant farm households declined from 1,133,000 in 1949 to essentially zero in 1950.
(Yoong-Deok and Kim, 2000).
Following the land reforms, expenditure on education soared. In 1949, a new Education
Law was passed within South Korea that focused speciﬁcally on transforming the population into
a technically competent workforce capable of industrial work. This led to dramatic increases
in the number of schools and students at all levels of education. Between 1945 and 1960 the
number of elementary schools increased by 60% and the number of elementary students went up
by a staggering 165%. In secondary education the growth is even more dramatic, with both the
number of schools and the number of students growing by a factor of ten in the same time period.
The number of higher education institutions quadrupled and the number of higher education
students increased from only 7,000 in 1945 to over 100,000 in 1960. In 1948, Korea allocated
8% of government expenditures to education. Following a slight decline due to the Korean war,
educational expenditure has increased to 9.2% in 1957 and 14.9% in 1960, remaining at about
15% thereafter.(Sah-Myung, 1983).
Taiwan experienced a similar path over the same period once the Japanese colonization
ended. The government of Taiwan implemented a land reform in the time period 1949-1953.
It enforced rent reductions, it sold public land to individual farmers who had previously been
tenants, and permitted the purchase of rented land. In 1948, prior to the land reform, 57% of
farm families were full or part owners, 43% were tenants or hired hands. By 1959 the share of
full or part owners had increased to 81%, and the share of tenants or hired-hands dropped to
19% (Cheng, 1961).
27A major force behind this land reform was the aim of the U.S. provisional government after WWII to remove
the inﬂuence of the large landowners (who were either Japanese or collaborators with the Japanese).
28Formally the education reform took place prior to the land reforms, but the provision for land reform was
enshrined in the constitution prior to the educational reform. The imminent land reform could have reduced the
incentives for the landed aristocracy to oppose this education reform.
10A massive educational reform followed the land reform. The number of schools in Taiwan
grew by 5% per year between 1950 and 1970, while the number of students grew by 6% a year.
The pattern of growth mirrors that of South Korea, with especially impressive growth of 11%
per year in the number of secondary students, and a 16% per year in higher education students.
Funding for education grew from 1.78% of GNP in 1951 to 4.12% in 1970 (Lin, 1983).
In 1950 South Korea and Taiwan were primarily agricultural economies with a GDP per
capita $770 and $936, respectively.29 South Korea and Taiwan lagged in GDP per capita well
behind many countries within Latin America, such as Colombia ($2153) and Mexico ($2365),
sharing with these countries a legacy of vast inequality in the distribution of agricultural land. In
contrast, to the Latin American countries, the implementation of land reforms in South Korea and
Taiwan and its apparent eﬀect of education reforms aﬀected their growth trajectory signiﬁcantly,
leading them to one of the most successful economic growth stories of the post-war period. From
a level of income per capita in 1950 that placed them not only far behind the nations of Latin
America but behind also Congo, Liberia, and Mozambique, these two countries have each grown
at an average rate of nearly 6% per year between 1950 and 1998, leaving behind the countries of
sub-Saharan Africa and overtaking the Latin American countries in this period. In 1998 South
Korea and Taiwan had GDP per capita levels 150% higher than Colombia and 100% higher than
Mexico (Maddison, 2001).
4 The Basic Structure of the Model
Consider an overlapping-generations economy in a process of development. In every period the
economy produces a single homogeneous good that can be used for consumption and investment.
The good is produced in an agricultural sector and in a manufacturing sector using land, physical
and human capital as well as raw labor. The stock of physical capital in every period is the output
produced in the preceding period net of consumption and human capital investment, whereas
the stock of human capital in every period is determined by the aggregate public investment
in education in the preceding period. The supply of land is ﬁxed over time. Physical capital
accumulation raises the demand for human capital and output grows due to the accumulation of
physical and human capital.30
29Measured in 1990 international dollars (Maddison, 2001).
30Alternatively, the rise in the demand for human capital could have been based on technological progress, and
output growth could have been due to technological progress and factor accumulation. This speciﬁcation would
not alter the main qualitative results.
114.1 Production of Final Output
The output in the economy in period t, yt, is given by the aggregate output in the agricultural
sector, yA





4.1.1 The Agricultural Sector
Production in the agricultural sector occurs within a period according to a neoclassical, constant-




t = F(Xt,L t), (2)
where Xt and Lt are land and the number of workers, respectively, employed by the agricultural
sector in period t. Hence, workers’ productivity in the agricultural sector is independent of their
level of human capital. The production function is strictly increasing and concave, the two factors
are complements in the production process, FXL > 0, and the function satisﬁes the neoclassical
boundary conditions that assure the existence of an interior solution to the producers’ proﬁt-
maximization problem.
Producers in the agricultural sector operate in a perfectly competitive environment. Given
the wage rate per worker, wA
t , and the rate of return to land, ρt, producers in period t choose the
l e v e lo fe m p l o y m e n to fl a b o r ,Lt, and land, Xt, so as to maximize proﬁts. That is, {Xt,L t} =
argmax [F(Xt,L t) − wtLt − ρtXt]. The producers’ inverse demand for factors of production is
therefore,
wA
t = FL(Xt,L t);
ρt = FX(Xt,L t).
(3)
4.1.2 Manufacturing Sector
Production in the manufacturing sector occurs within a period according to a neoclassical,
constant-returns-to-scale, Cobb-Douglas production technology using physical and human capital






t ; kt ≡ Kt/Ht; α ∈ (0,1), (4)
where Kt and Ht are the quantities of physical capital and human capital (measured in eﬃciency
units) employed in production at time t. Physical capital depreciates fully after one period. In
31As will become apparent, the choice of a Cobb-Douglas production function assures that there is no conﬂict of
interest between Capitalists and Workers regarding the optimal education policy, permitting the analysis to focus
on the conﬂict between the Landowners and the Capitalists.
12contrast to the agricultural sector, human capital has a positive eﬀect on workers’ productivity
in the manufacturing sector.
Producers in the manufacturing sector operate in a perfectly competitive environment.
Given the wage rate per eﬃciency unit of labor, wM
t , and the rate of return to capital, Rt,
producers in period t choose the level of employment of capital, Kt, and the number of eﬃciency












In every period a generation which consists of a continuum of individuals of measure 1 is born.
Individuals live for two periods. Each individual has a single parent and a single child. Individuals,
within as well as across generations, are identical in their preferences and innate abilities but they
may diﬀer in their wealth.
Preferences of individual i w h oi sb o r ni np e r i o dt (a member i of generation t)a r ed e -
ﬁned over second period consumption,32 ci
t+1, and a transfer to the oﬀspring, bi
t+1.33 They are
represented by a log-linear utility function
ui
t =( 1− β)lnci
t+1 + β lnbi
t+1, (6)
where β ∈ (0,1).
In the ﬁrst period of their lives individuals acquire human capital. In the second period
of their lives individuals join the labor force, allocating the resulting wage income, along with
their return to capital and land, between consumption and income transfer to their children. In
addition, individuals transfer their entire stock of land to their oﬀspring.34
An individual i born in period t receives a transfer, bi
t, in the ﬁrst period of life. A fraction
τt ≥ 0 of this capital transfer is collected by the government in order to ﬁnance public education,
whereas a fraction 1 − τt is saved for future income. Individuals devote their ﬁrst period for the
acquisition of human capital. Education is provided publicly free of charge. The acquired level
32For simplicity we abstract from ﬁrst period consumption. It may be viewed as part of the consumption of the
parent.
33This form of altruistic bequest motive (i.e., the “joy of giving”) is the common form in the recent literature on
income distribution and growth. It is supported empirically by Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoﬀ (1997). As discussed
in section 4, if individuals generate utility from the utility of their oﬀspring the qualitative results remain intact.
34This assumption capture the well established fact that at least in early stages of development, land is not fully
tradable due to (e.g., agency and moral hazard problems). (See Bertocchi, 2006). It is designed to assure that
landowners could be meaningfully deﬁned as a distinct viable class. If land would be fully traded, land holdings
would be equivalent to any other asset holdings and in contrast to historical evidence, landowners would not be a
signiﬁcant force in the political structure of the economy.
13of human capital increases with the real resources invested in public education. The number
of eﬃciency units of human capital of each member of generation t in period t +1 , ht+1, is a
strictly increasing, strictly concave function of the government real expenditure on education per
member of generation t, et.35
ht+1 = h(et), (7)
where h(0) = 1, limet→0+ h0(et)=∞, and limet→∞ h0(et)=0 . Hence, even in the absence of
real expenditure on public education individuals still posses one eﬃciency unit of human capital
- basic skills - assuring the operation of the industrial sector in every time period.
In the second period of life, members of generation t join the labor force earning the
competitive market wage wt+1. In addition, individual i derives income from capital ownership,
bi
t(1 − τt)Rt+1, and from the return on land ownership, xiρt+1, where xi is the quantity of land
owned by individual i. The individual’s second period income, Ii
t+1, is therefore
Ii
t+1 = wt+1 + bi
t(1 − τt)Rt+1 + xiρt+1. (8)
Am e m b e ri of generation t allocates second period income between consumption, ci
t+1,
and transfers to the oﬀspring, bi











t+1 =( 1− β)Ii
t+1, and the indirect utility function of a member i of generation t,
vi




t+1 + ξ ≡ v(Ii
t+1), (11)
where ξ ≡ (1 − β)ln(1− β)+β lnβ.
4.3 Physical Capital, Human Capital, and Output
The aggregate level of intergenerational transfers in period t, as follows from (10), is a fraction
β from the aggregate level of income yt. Af r a c t i o nτt of this capital transfer is collected by the
35A more realistic formulation would link the cost of education to (teacher’s) wages, which may vary in the
process of development. As can be derived from section 3.4, under both formulations the optimal expenditure on
education, et, is an increasing function of the capital-labor ratio in the economy, and the qualitative results remain
therefore intact.
36Note that individual’s preferences deﬁned over the transfer to the oﬀspring, b
i
t, or over net transfer, (1−τt)b
i
t, are
represented in an indistinguishable manner by the log linear utility function. Under both deﬁnitions of preferences





14government in order to ﬁnance public education, whereas a fraction 1 − τt is saved for future
consumption. The capital stock in period t +1 , Kt+1, is therefore
Kt+1 =( 1− τt)βyt, (12)
whereas the government tax revenues are τtβyt.
Let θt+1 be the fraction (and the number - since population is normalized to 1)o fw o r k e r s
employed in the manufacturing sector. The education expenditure per young individual in period
t, et,i s ,
et = τtβyt, (13)
and the stock of human capital, employed in the manufacturing sector in period t +1 , Ht+1, is
therefore,
Ht+1 = θt+1h(τtβyt), (14)
Hence, output in the manufacturing sector in period t +1is,
yM
t+1 =[ ( 1− τt)βyt]α[θt+1h(τtβyt)]1−α ≡ yM(yt,τt,θt+1), (15)





where kt+1 is strictly decreasing in τt and in θt+1, and strictly increasing in yt. As follows from
(5), the capital share in the manufacturing sector is
(1 − τt)βytRt+1 = αyM
t+1, (17)
and the labor share in the manufacturing sector is given by
θt+1h(τtβyt)wM
t+1 =( 1− α)yM
t+1. (18)
The supply of labor to agriculture, Lt+1, is equal to 1−θt+1 and the supply of land is ﬁxed
over time at a level X>0. Output in the agriculture sector in period t +1is, therefore,
yA
t+1 = F(X,1 − θt+1) ≡ yA(θt+1;X). (19)
As follows from the properties of the production functions both sectors are active in t +1
as long as τt < 1. Hence, since individuals are perfectly mobile between the two sectors they can
either supply one unit of labor to the agriculture sector and receive the wage wA
t+1 or supply ht+1





t+1 ≡ wt+1, (20)
37Even if mobility between the sectors is not fully unrestricted, the qualitative results would not be altered.
15and the fraction of employment in the manufacturing sector, θt+1, equalizes the marginal product
of workers in the two sectors, and thus maximizes output per capita in the economy.
Lemma 1 The fraction of workers employed by the manufacturing sector in period t+1, θt+1 is
uniquely determined:
θt+1 = θ(yt,τt;X),
where θX(yt,τt;X) < 0, θy(yt,τt;X) > 0, and limy→∞ θ(yt,τt;X)=1 .
Moreover, θt+1 maximizes output in period t +1 ,y t+1 :
θt+1 =a r gm a xyt+1.
Proof. Substitution (3), (5), and (16) into (20) it follows that






Hence, since ∂Φ(θt+1,y t,τt;X)/∂θt+1 > 0, it follows from the Implicit Function Theorem that
there exist a single valued function θt+1 = θ(yt,τt;X), where the properties of the function are
obtained noting the properties of the function h(τtβyt) and FL(X,1−θt+1). Moreover, since θt+1
equalizes the marginal return to labor in the two sectors, and since the marginal products of all
factors of production are decreasing in both sectors, θt+1 =a r gm a xyt+1. ¤





Proof. As established in Lemma 1, θt+1 = θ(yt,τt;X), and the corollary follows noting (3), (5),
(16) and (19). ¤
4.4 Eﬃcient Expenditure on Public Education
This section demonstrates that the level of expenditure on public schooling (and hence the level
of taxation) that maximizes aggregate output is optimal from the viewpoint of all individuals
except for landowners who own a large fraction of the land in the economy.
Lemma 2 Let τ∗








t = τ∗(yt) ∈ (0,1) is unique, and τ∗(yt)yt, is strictly increasing in yt.
(c) τ∗
t =a r gm a xyM
t+1.
(d) τ∗
t =a r gm a x ( 1− τt)Rt+1.
(e) τ∗
t =a r gm a xθ(yt,τt;X).
(f) τ∗
t =a r gm a xwt+1.
(g) τ∗
t =a r gm i nρt+1.
Proof.
(a) As follows from (15), (19), and Lemma 1, aggregate output in period t +1 ,y t+1 is
yt+1 = y(yt,τt;X)=yM(yt,τt,θ(yt,τt;X)) + yA(θ(yt,τt;X);X). (22)









t =a r gm a xyt+1 then ∂yM(yt,τ∗
t,θt+1)/∂τt =0 , and thus as follows from
(15),













and the proof follows, noting that αkα−1
t+1 ≡ R(kt+1) and (1 − α)kα
t+1 ≡ wM(kt+1).











tβyt) ≥ 1 for all τ∗
tβyt ≥ 0 and limet→0+ h0(et)=∞, it follows that τ∗
t = τ∗(yt) ∈
(0,1) for all yt > 0. The uniqueness τ∗
t follows from the properties of the function h(τ∗
tβyt).
Furthermore, τ∗(yt)yt is increasing in yt. Suppose not. Suppose that τ∗(yt)yt is decreasing in yt.
It follows that τ∗ is strictly decreasing in yt and therefore the left hand side of (26) is strictly
increasing in yt whereas the right hand side is decreasing. A contradiction.
(c) As derived in part (a), since τ∗
t =a r gm a xyt+1, it follows from the envelope theorem that
τ∗
t =a r gm a xyM(yt,τt,θ(yt,τt;X)) = argmax[(1 − τt)βyt]α[h(τtβyt)]1−αθ1−α
t+1 . (27)
(d) Follows from part (c) noting that, as follows from (17), (1 − τt)Rt+1 = αyM
t+1/(βyt).
(e) As follows from part (c)
τ∗
t =a r gm a x [ ( 1− τt)βyt]α[h(τtβyt)]1−αθ1−α
t+1 , (28)
17and therefore for any θt+1,
τ∗
t =a r gm a x [ ( 1− τt)βyt]α[h(τtβyt)]1−α. (29)
Moreover, since
θt+1 = θ(yt,τt;X)
=a r gm a xyt+1 =a r gm a x [ ( 1− τt)βyt]α[h(τtβyt)]1−αθ1−α
t+1 + F(X,1 − θt+1),
(30)
it is strictly increasing in [(1 − τt)βyt]α[h(τtβyt)]1−α, and therefore τ∗
t =a r gm a xθ(yt,τt;X).
(f) As follows from (3) and (20),
wt+1 = FL(X,1 − θt+1), (31)
and therefore since wt+1 is monotonically increasing in θt+1 it follows from part (e) that τ∗
t =
argmaxwt+1.
(g) Follows from part (f) noting that along the factor price frontier ρt decreases in wA
t and
therefore in wt. ¤
As established in Lemma 2 the value of τ∗
t is independent of the size of land, X.T h e s i z e o f
land has two opposing eﬀects on τ∗
t that cancel one another due to the Cobb-Douglass production
function in the manufacturing sector. Since a larger land size implies that employment in the
manufacturing sector is lower, the fraction of the labor force whose productivity is improved due
to taxation that is designed to ﬁnance universal public education is lower. In contrast, the return
to each unit of human capital employed in the manufacturing sector is higher while the return to
physical capital is lower, since human capital in the manufacturing sector is scarce.
Furthermore, since the tax rate is linear and the elasticity of substitution between human
and physical capital in the manufacturing sector is unitary, as established in Lemma 2, the tax
rate that maximizes aggregate output in period t+1also maximizes the wage per worker, wt+1,
and the net return to capital, (1 − τ∗
t)Rt+1. Hence, there is no conﬂict of interest between
Capitalists and Workers regarding the optimal education policy.38 Moreover, given the factor
price frontier, since τ∗
t maximizes the wage per worker, wt+1, it minimizes the rent on land, ρt+1.
As follows from Lemma 2, the desirable tax policy from the viewpoint of individual i
depends on the income that the individual derives for land holding, xiρt+1, relative to the income
that the individual generates from capital holding and wages, wt+1+bi
t(1−τt)Rt+1. In particular,
38The absence of disagreement between the Capitalists and Workers about the optimal tax policy would hold as
long as the production function is Cobb-Douglas. However, even if the elasticity of substitution would be diﬀerent
than one, in contrast to land owners, both groups would support public education although they would diﬀer in
their desirable tax rates. If the elasticity is larger than unity but ﬁnite, then the tax rate that maximizes the wage
per worker would have been larger than the optimal tax rate and the tax rate that maximizes the return to capital
would have been lower, yet strictly positive. If the elasticity of substitution is smaller than unity, the opposite
holds.
18as established in the following proposition, individuals whose land income is suﬃciently small
relative to their capital and wage income would support the eﬃcient tax policy.
Proposition 1 Given (bi
t,y t,X),t h e r ee x i s t sas u ﬃciently low level of land holding by individual
i, ˆ xi, such that the desirable level of taxation from the viewpoint of individual i is the level of
taxation that maximizes output per capita, τ∗
t. ˆ xi is inversely related to the level of bi
t.
Proof. Since the indirect utility function of individual i, is a strictly increasing function of
the individual’s second period wealth, Ii
t+1, the desirable level of taxation from the viewpoint
of individual i, maximizes Ii
t+1 = Ii(yt,τt,b i
t,x i;X)=w(yt,τt;X)+bi
t(1 − τt)R(yt,τt;X)+
xiρ(yt,τt;X). As established in Lemma 2, wt+1, and (1−τt)Rt+1 are maximized by τ∗
t, and ρt+1
is minimized by τ∗
t. Hence, ∂Ii(yt,τ∗
t,b i
t,x i,X)/∂τt =0and for xi =0 , τ∗
t is a global maximum
and for xi →∞ , τ∗
t is a global minimum. Since ∂ρ(yt,τt,b i
t,x i,X)/∂τt < ∞, it follows from the
continuity of Ii(yt,τ∗
t,b i
t,x i,X) in xi that there exists a suﬃciently low level of xi, ˆ xi, such that
τ∗
t =a r gm a xIi
t+1 for all xi ≤ ˆ xi (i.e., there exists a suﬃciently low xi such that τ∗
t maximizes
Ii
t+1 globally), where ˆ xi is inversely related to the levels of bi
t. ¤
4.5 Political Mechanism
In light of our interest in the eﬀect of economic rather than political transitions on education
reforms and economic growth, the political structure of the economy was designed as a station-
ary structure that is unaﬀected by economic development. In particular, we deliberately impose
a crude political mechanism under which education reforms require the consent of the class of
Landowners. Although economic development does not aﬀect this political structure, it changes
the economic incentives confronted by landowners and thereby aﬀect their attitude towards ed-
ucations reforms.
Clearly, even in democracies, the median voting model is not perfectly applicable. Strong
interest groups, such as landowners, exert a larger inﬂuence on public policy relative to their
representation in the population. For the sake of simplicity we adopt an extreme modeling
approach that provides landowners as a group with a veto power against education reforms.
The adoption of some alternative approaches, such as a lobbing model, or probabilistic voting
model (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987), would not change the qualitative results. Moreover, in
order to focus on the conﬂict between Landowners and the remaining segments of the economy,
we abstract from a potential conﬂict of interest among landowners, assuming land is equally
distributed across landowners, and coordination among landowners is therefore not essential.39
39The introduction of inequality in landholdings across landowners would not aﬀect the qualitative results. It
w o u l dh a v ea na m b i g u o u se ﬀect on the timing of education reforms. Large landowners that would be expected to
suﬀer a larger loss in rental rents due to education reforms, would be engaged in more intense lobbying activity
to block these reforms, but their force will be diminished due to their smaller representation within the group of
landowners.
19Suppose that changes in the existing educational policy require the consent of all segments
of society. In the absence of consensus the existing educational policy remains intact. Suppose
further that consistently with the historical experience, societies initially do not ﬁnance education
(i.e., τ0 =0 ) . It follows that unless all segments of society would ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to alter the
existing educational policy the tax rate will remain zero. Once all segments of society ﬁnd it
beneﬁcial to implement educational policy that maximizes aggregate output, this policy would
remain in eﬀect unless all segments of society would support an alternative policy.
4.6 Landlords’ Desirable Schooling Policy
Suppose that in period 0 af r a c t i o nλ ∈ (0,1) of all young individuals in society are Landlords
while a fraction 1 − λ are landless. Each landlord owns an equal fraction of the entire stock of
land, X, and is endowed with bL
0 units of output. Since landlords are homogeneous in period 0
and since land is bequeathed from parent to child and each individual has a single child and a
single parent, it follows that the distribution of land ownership in society is constant over time,
where each landlord owns X/λ units of land. Similarly, capital is equally divided within the class
of landlords, each endowed with bL
t units of output in period t.
The income of each landlord in the second period of life, IL
t+1, as follows from (8) and
Corollary 1, is therefore
IL
t+1 = w(yt,τt;X)+( 1− τt)R(yt,τt;X)bL
t + ρ(yt,τt;X)X/λ, (32)
and bL
t+1, as follows from (10) is therefore
bL
t+1 = β[w(yt,τt;X)+( 1− τt)R(yt,τt;X)bL
t + ρ(yt,τt;X)X/λ] ≡ bL(yt,b L
t ,τt;X,λ). (33)
As summarized in the following Lemma, the economy advances and the share of land in
aggregate output gradually declines, the stake of landowners in other sectors gradually increases,
due to their labor and capital holdings, and their objection to education reforms therefore declines
over time.40
Proposition 2 In the absence of taxation in the initial period, i.e., τ0 =0 , given the political
mechanism,




t , above which their income under the eﬃcient tax policy τ∗
t is higher than under τt =0 ,
40If land is also used in the manufacturing sector, the results will not be aﬀected qualitatively, as long as the
share of land that is employed in the industrial sector is initially small. The rise in the rental rate on industrial
land in the process of urbanization and its impact on the rise on the rental rate of land in the economy as a whole,
would just accelerate the transition, since it will increase landowners beneﬁts from the process of industrialization.
20and the economy switches to τ∗










(b) The critical level of capital holdings, ˆ BL
t , above which the eﬃcient tax policy is chosen,
(i) increases with the degree of land inequality in the economy, i.e.,
∂ ˆ BL(yt;X,λ)/∂λ < 0;
(ii) is zero for a suﬃciently low level of land inequality (i.e. for a suﬃciently large λ).I n
particular,
limλ→1 ˆ BL(yt;X,λ) ≤ 0.
(iii) is zero for a suﬃciently large level of income per capita. In particular,
limyt→∞ ˆ BL(yt;X,λ) ≤ 0.
(c) Let ˆ t be the ﬁrst period in which the eﬃcient tax policy, τt = τ∗
t, is implemented. The eﬃcient
tax policy will remain in place thereafter, i.e.,
τt = τ∗
t ∀t ≥ ˆ t.
Proof.
(a) Noting that landlords are identical and their number is unchanged in the process of develop-
ment, the tax policy that maximizes income of all landowners also maximizes the income of each
landowner. As follows from (32), ˆ BL
t+1 = ˆ BL(yt;X,λ) is the level of BL
t = λbL
t that equates the
income of landowners in the case were τt =0and τt = τ∗
t. ˆ BL
t+1 exists since as established in
Lemma 2 τ∗
t =a r gm a x ( 1− τt)Rt+1 and thus (1 − τ∗
t)R(yt,τ∗
t;X) − R(yt,0;X) > 0.
(b) (i) Follows directly from the derivation of ˆ b(yt;X,λ), with respect to λ, noting that for a
given yt, λ has no eﬀect on prices and that for yt > 0, τ∗
t =a r g m a x wt+1 > 0, and therefore
[w(yt,0;X) − w(yt,τ∗
t;X)] < 0.
(b) (ii) Since the agriculture production function (2) is CRS, it follows that the aggregate return
to land is
Xρt+1 = F(X,1 − θt+1) − wt+1(1 − θt+1). (34)
Hence, landlord’s income, λIi
t+1 = λwt+1 +( 1− τt)Rt+1BL
t + Xρt+1, is
λIL
t+1 = w(yt,τt;X)[λ + θt+1 − 1] + (1 − τt)R(yt,τt;X)BL
t + F(X,1 − θt+1). (35)

























> 0 for τ < τ∗
t
=0for τ = τ∗
t
< 0 for τ > τ∗
t,
(37)
and therefore for a suﬃciently large λ the threshold is zero, i.e., limλ→1 ˆ BL(yt;X,λ) ≤ 0.
(b) (iii) As follows from Lemma 1, as yt →∞ , θt+1 → 1 and therefore it follows from (36) that
for any BL
t ≥ 0, (37) holds and hence limyt→∞ ˆ BL(yt;X,λ) ≤ 0.
(c) As established in Proposition 1, the desirable tax policy from the viewpoint of workers and
capitalists is τ∗
t. Hence, given that the political mechanism requires a consensus for changes in
the tax policy, once the chosen tax rate is τ∗
t it will remain so thereafter.41 ¤
Remark. There exists a range of agricultural production functions (e.g., in which the
elasticity of substitution between labor and land is 0,1 and ∞), such that the desirable level
of taxation from the viewpoint of landowners (in the range τL
t ∈ [0,τ∗
t] are τ =0or τ = τ∗.42
However, even if the desirable level of taxation from the viewpoint of a landowner would have
been τL
t ∈ (0,τ∗
t), given the political mechanism, and the absence of taxation in period 0, the
tax rate that prevails in the economy in every period t is either 0 or τ∗
t. Under a diﬀerent
political structures the transition from a zero tax rate to τ∗
t could be a gradual process. The
process of development will induce landowners to compromise (or support) increasingly higher
levels of taxation and the qualitative results regarding the adverse eﬀect of land inequality on
the implementation of education reforms would remain intact.
5 The Process of Development
This section analyzes the evolution of an economy from an agricultural to an industrial-based
economy. It demonstrates that the gradual decline in the importance of the agricultural sector
along with an increase in the capital holdings in landlords’ portfolio may alter the attitude of
landlords towards educational reforms. In societies in which land is scarce or its ownership is
distributed rather equally, the process of development allows the implementation of an optimal
education policy, and the economy experiences a signiﬁcant investment in human capital and a
rapid process of development. In contrast, in societies where land is abundant and its distribution
41It should be noted that, in fact, landowners optimal tax rate will remain τ
∗ thereafter, since education reforms
would further increase the stake of landowners in the non-agricultural part of the economy.
42(i) If land and labor are perfect substitutes the marginal productivity of land is independent of the amount of
labor employed. Landowners would therefore prefer τt = τ
∗
t so as to maximize the return to their labor and capital
holdings. (ii) If land and labor are perfect complements, as established in Proposition 5, as long as the wage rate is
below the threshold level above which the demand for workers in agriculture is zero, landowners prefer the lowest
level of industrial output, y
M
t , and hence τt =0 . Clearly, above the threshold they prefer τ
∗
t since the return to
land is zero anyway. (iii) If the production function is Cobb-Douglas F(X,Lt)=AX
γL
1−γ
t , as established in
Appendix 1, landowners would prefer either τt =0or τt = τ
∗
t over any τt ∈ (0,τ
∗
t).
22is unequal, an ineﬃcient education policy will persist and the economy will experience a lower
growth path as well as a lower level of output in the long-run.






ψ0(yt) ≡ (βyt)αθ(yt,0;X)1−α + F(X,1 − θ(yt,0;X)) for τt =0 ;
ψ∗(yt) ≡ [(1 − τ∗
t)βyt)α[θ(yt,τ∗
t;X)h(τ∗
tβyt))1−α + F(X,1 − θ(yt,τ∗
t;X)) for τt = τ∗
t,
where,
ψ∗(yt) > ψ0(yt) for yt > 0.
dψj(yt)/dyt > 0,d 2ψj(yt)/dy2
t < 0, ψj(0) = F(X,1) > 0,d ψj(yt)/dX > 0,a n d
limyt→∞dψj(yt)/dyt =0 ;j =0 ,∗.
Proof. As follows from (1), (15) and (19), yt+1 = yA
t+1+yM
t+1 =[ ( 1 −τt)βyt)α[θt+1h(τtβyt))1−α+
F(X,1 − θt+1). Thus, noting that, h(0) = 1 the evolution of yt+1 as stated in the proposition
is obtained. Since τ∗
t =a r g m a x yt+1 and τ∗
t > 0, it follows that ψ∗(yt) > ψ0(yt) for yt > 0.
As follows from Lemma 1 and Proposition 2, the properties of the functions ψ∗(yt) and ψ0(yt)
follows, noting that θt+1 =a r gm a xyt+1, τ∗
t =a r gm a xyt+1 and applying the envelop theorem.¤
Note that the evolution of output per capita, for a given schooling policy, is independent
of the distribution of land and income.
Corollary 2 Given the size of land, X, there exists a unique ¯ y0 a n dau n i q u e¯ y∗ such that
¯ y0 = ψ0(¯ y0);
¯ y∗ = ψ∗(¯ y∗),
where ¯ y∗ > ¯ y0.
Proof. Follows from the properties of ψ∗(yt) and ψ0(yt), as established in Proposition 3. ¤
The evolution of income per capita. as depicted in Figure 1, and as follows from Proposition





ψ0(yt) for t<ˆ t
ψ∗(yt) for t≥ ˆ t.
Hence, the economy evolves on the lower trajectory dictated by ψ0(yt) till time ˆ t (e.g.,
w h e r et h el e v e lo fi n c o m ei sˆ y ≡ yˆ t) and then moves to a higher trajectory that is governed by
ψ∗(yt).
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Figure 1: Education Reform and the Evolution of Output Per Capita
Proposition 4 For a given set of initial conditions, (i.e., y0,k 0,X ,h 0 =1 , BL
0 = λβIL
0 <
ˆ BL(y0;X,λ) and therefore τ0 =0 ), a less equal land distribution, (i.e., a low level of λ), will
generate a delay in the implementation of an eﬃcient education policy and will therefore result
in an inferior growth path. That is, a less equal land distribution implies that the timing of the
implementation of the eﬃcient tax policy, ˆ t, is delayed.
Proof. As follows from (33), noting that BL
t+1 = λbL
t+1 = λβIL
t+1, the evolution of aggregate








As established in Proposition 3, as long as τt =0 , the evolution of income per capita, yt, is
independent of λ. Hence it follows from Corollary 1 that factor prices are independent of λ
and therefore, as follows from (38), BL
t is increasing in λ. Hence, noting that as established in
Proposition 2 ˆ BL(yt;X,λ) is decreasing with λ, the lower is λ the larger is ˆ t (i.e., the later is the
time period in which BL
t > ˆ BL
t ). ¤
Proposition 5 (Persistence of Ineﬃcient Education Policy) If the productivity in the manufac-
turing sector is limited, and the degree of complementarity between land and labor is suﬃciently
high, then there exists a suﬃciently high level of land inequality (i.e., a suﬃciently low λ), such
that ineﬃcient education policy will persist indeﬁnitely (i.e., ˆ t →∞ ).
24Proof. Suppose that the production function in the agriculture sector is yA
t = F(X,Lt)=
min{X,Lt}, where, X<1 (i.e., X is smaller than the size of the working population) to assure
that some workers are employed in the industrial sector. Hence, for wt < 1,X= Lt =1−θt. As
follows from (18) and (20), wt =( 1− α)yM
t /θt. Therefore, for wt < 1,













ρt =1 − yM
t .
Hence, if for yM
t < 1, the income of all landowners, noting (17), is
λIL
t = λwt + ρtX + sL
t αyM




t is the share of landowners in the total capital stock. Since sL
t < 1, it follows that for
as u ﬃciently low λ landowners’ income is decreasing with yM
t , as long as yM
t < 1.Hence, since
¯ y0 < ψ∗(¯ y0), then if ψ∗(¯ y0) < 1 landowners prefer τt =0 , rather than τt = τ∗
t when yt =¯ y0. ¤
Hence, under the conditions speciﬁed in Proposition 5 there exists a steady state equi-
librium in which an ineﬃcient education policy exists. In particular, as depicted in Figure 2,
country A reaches a steady-state equilibrium at a level of income per-capita
£
¯ y0¤A , prior to the
implementation of education reforms that would have occurred if the level of income per capita
in the economy would have reached ˆ yA.
Thus, among countries where land inequality is higher, (i.e., λ is smaller) a poverty trap,
in which ineﬃcient education policy persists may emerge. In particular, a country could reach
the low income steady state ¯ y0 before reaching the point in which BL
t is suﬃciently large to
bring about a policy shift. In contrast, for suﬃciently equal economies, ˆ t is necessarily ﬁnite. In
particular if land ownership is equally distributed across members of society (i.e., if λ =1 ) , then
as established in Proposition 2, the eﬃcient tax policy is implemented in period 0.
Hence, the distribution of land within and across countries aﬀected the nature of the
transition from an agrarian to an industrial economy, generating diverging growth patterns across
countries. Furthermore, land abundance that was beneﬁcial in early stages of development,
brought about a hurdle for human capital accumulation and economic growth among countries
that were marked by an unequal distribution of land ownership. As depicted in Figure 2, some
land abundant countries which were associated with the club of the rich economies in the pre-
industrial revolution era and were characterized by an unequal distribution of land, were overtaken
in the process of industrialization by land scarce countries. The qualitative change in the role of
25land in the process of industrialization has brought about changes in the ranking of countries in
the world income distribution.
Remark. If the utility of individuals is deﬁned over the discounted stream of utilities of their
oﬀspring, the qualitative results will not be aﬀected. An earlier implementation of education
reforms would raise the income of future members of a landowner’s dynasty on the account of the
contemporary income of the landowner. The optimal timing of the implementation of education
reforms from the viewpoint of each landowner would depend, therefore, on the discount factor
applied for future members of the dynasty. It would occur earlier than in the case in which
individuals do not generate utility from the utility of their oﬀspring, but would be still aﬀected
adversely by the degree of land inequality, since it determines the relative stake of landowners in
other segments of the economy.43
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Figure 2: Overtaking — country A is relatively richer in land, however, due to land inequality it
fails to implement eﬃcient schooling and is overtaken by country B. Alternatively, for a lower de-
gree of inequality, country A will eventually implement education reforms and ultimately takeover
country B (not captured in the ﬁgure).
43In particular, if ¯ y
∗ < 1, in the context of Proposition 5, there exists a suﬃciently high level of land inequality
such that ineﬃcient education policy will persist indeﬁnitely (i.e., landowners would not ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to
implement education reforms in any time period). In this case, regardless of the discount factor applied to oﬀspring
the timing of education reforms will not be aﬀected at all (i.e., ˆ t →∞ ).
266 Evidence from the US High School Movement
The central hypothesis of this research, that land inequality adversely aﬀected the timing of
education reform, is examined empirically using variations in public spending on education across
states and over time in the US during the high school movement. Historical evidence from the
US on education expenditures and land ownership in the period 1880-1950 suggests that land
inequality had a signiﬁcant adverse eﬀect on educational expenditures during this period.44
6.1 The US High School Movement
During the time period 1900-1950 the education system in the US underwent a major trans-
formation from insigniﬁcant secondary education to nearly universal secondary education. As
established by Goldin (1998), in 1910 high school graduation rates were between 9-15% in the
Northeast and the Paciﬁc regions and only about 4% in the South. By 1950 graduation rates
were nearly 60% in the Northeast and the Paciﬁc regions and about 40% in the South. Further-
more, Goldin and Katz (1997) document signiﬁcant variation in the timing of these changes and
their extensiveness across regions.45
The high school movement and its qualitative eﬀect on the structure of education in the US
reﬂected an educational shift towards non-agricultural learning that is at the heart of the proposed
hypothesis. The high school movement was undertaken with the intention of building a skilled
work-force that could better serve the manufacturing sector. Over this period, ﬁrms increasingly
demanded skilled workers that could be eﬀective managers, sales personnel, and clerical workers,
and courses in accounting, typing, shorthand, and algebra were highly valued in the white-collar
occupations. In addition, in the 1910s, some of the high-technology industries of the period
started to demand blue-collar craft workers who were trained in mathematics, chemistry, and
electricity (Goldin, 1999).
The proposed theory suggests that land inequality was signiﬁcant in determining the pace
of education reforms across the U.S. We exploit diﬀerences in education expenditures across
states over 1900-1950 to identify the role of the inequality in the distribution of landownership
on the pace of education reforms, controlling for the level of income per capita, the percentage
of the black population, and the urbanization rate within each state.
44For other studies of the relationship between land and economic performance in the US over this time period
see Gerber (1991) and Coleman and Caselli (2001).
45Consistently with the proposed theory and the empirical ﬁndings, Wright (1986) suggests that Southern gov-
ernments, inﬂuenced heavily by landholders, refused to expand enrollments and spending in education because the
North which provided a signiﬁcant outside option for educated workers would reap the beneﬁts from it.
276.2 Data
The historical data that is utilized in this study is gathered from several sources. Education
expenditure levels are obtained from the Historical Statistics of the United States for 1920 and
1950, and from the U.S. Bureau of Education, Report of the Commissioner of Education for 1880
and 1900. These expenditures are converted to 1929 dollars to match the income per capita
estimates used.
The level of expenditure per child within each state is computed, utilizing data on the
number of children in the state in each of the relevant years from the relevant U.S. Census.46
The total population of school-age children in each state, rather than the actual number of
students, is used because states could controlled their total expenditures by limiting the number
of actual pupil (e.g., the exclusion of blacks from public education in the South during much of
the period under study).
Education expenditure varied greatly over this period. For example, in 1900 the state
of Alabama was spending $2.58 (in 1929 dollars) per child on education. In contrast, Massa-
chusetts had expenditures of $36.45 per child, a fourteen-fold diﬀerence. By 1920, Alabama had
expenditures of $11.58 per child, while spending in Massachusetts had increased to $44.67, only
four times greater than Alabama’s spending. In 1950, the gap had narrowed to less than a factor
of two, $63.50 for Alabama and $107.55 for Massachusetts.
The level of land inequality is captured by constructing a Gini coeﬃcient for land distribu-
tion within each state using U.S. Census data.47 Data on the number and area of farms for each
state/year observation was used to estimate a Lorenz curve, from which the Gini was derived.
(See Appendix 3). In 1880, the average U.S. state had a Gini index of land inequality of approx-
imately 0.41. Inequality was lowest in the Midwest, where the Gini indexes were around 0.29,
and highest in the South, with Gini indexes around 0.50. Over time, Gini coeﬃcients rose across
the whole U.S., and by 1920 the average Gini was 0.53. The upward shift hid wide variation in
changes in land inequality across states. The Gini in California rose from 0.58 to 0.81 over this
period, and many other states in the West saw large increases in land inequality. On the other
hand, the South, starting from a high initial level of inequality, witnessed ﬂat or declining Gini’s
over this period, with a drop from 0.62 to 0.54 in South Carolina and drop from 0.57 to 0.51 in
Georgia.
46The precise age ranges used in each census vary, but as these changes are common to all states, this does not
introduce any bias into the results. The available age ranges are 5-17 years old in 1880, 5-20 years in 1900, 7-20
years in 1920, and 5-19 years in 1950
47An important point to note about these Gini coeﬃcients is that they only reﬂect inequality in land-holdings
within the group of landowners. Diﬀerences between states in the level of landlessness are not captured, and
therefore the Gini underestimates the variation in land inequality across U.S. states. As this exclusion will make
it more diﬃc u l tt oe s t a b l i s har e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e nt h ev a r i a t i o ni nl a n di n e q u a l i t ya n dv a r i a t i o ni ne d u c a t i o n ,w e
feel it is an acceptable omission and in fact tends to strengthen the results that follow.
28Several other controls are included in the speciﬁcations. Income per capita, is based
estimates in Easterlin (1957) for 1880, 1900, 1920 and 1950 (measured in 1929 dollars). The
percentage of population that is black is taken from the U.S. Census for the relevant years. As
mentioned above, black students often suﬀered not only from insuﬃcient funding but were also
excluded from the education system entirely in many places. Margo (1990) identiﬁes several
avenues along which black students suﬀered in relation to their white peers during the periods
of the study. Blacks also lived predominantly in the South, where land inequality was relatively
high as a result of the plantation system. Therefore we include the measure of black population
to ensure that the relationship between education and land inequality is not simply reﬂecting the
eﬀects of the racial political situation in the South during this period.48 The ﬁnal control, the
percentage of urban population, also taken from the U.S. Census. It is added for several reasons.
Given economies of scale, it may be that more urbanized states in fact have lower expenditures
per child due to their higher density. Furthermore, urbanization and industrialization are highly
correlated, and urbanization may partly control for capital intensity across states as well.49
6.3 Empirical Speciﬁcation and Results
The empirical analysis examines the eﬀect of inequality on the distribution of land ownership
in state i in period t − 1, on log expenditure per child in state i in period t,o v e rf o u rp e r i o d s
of observation: 1880, 1900, 1920 and 1950. In particular, for t = 1900,1920,1950, and t − 1=
1880,1900,1920, respectively,
lneit = β0 + β1Gi,t−1 + β2 lnyi,t−1 + β3Ui,t−1 + β4Bi,t−1 + vit, (39)
where Gi,t−1 is the Gini coeﬃcient of inequality in land ownership in state i in period t − 1,
lnyi,t−1 is log income per capita in state i in period t − 1, Ui,t−1 is the percentage of the urban
population in state i in period t−1, Bi,t−1 is the percentage of the black population in state i in
period t − 1,a n dvit is the error term of state i.50
48An additional avenue of inﬂuence for the black population (and labor in general) involves mobility. Wright
(1986) argued that some Southern states limited education spending because of the fear that the educated workers
would migrate out of their home states. However, while the amount of internal migration was large in absolute
terms, relative to the size of the population it was much less important. Eldridge and Thomas (1957) calculate an
index of interstate redistribution, which measures the percent of the population that would have to be moved in
any decade in order to match the previous decades distribution by state. In 1900-1910, this index is 4.25%, and
then is lower in every decade through 1940-1950. As this index also reﬂects changes in population distribution
due to fertility diﬀerences between states, it overestimates the eﬀect of internal migration. It thus seems likely
that there was appreciable friction to labor mobility, and that local education expenditures could, to some extent,
beneﬁt local populations. Including net migration rates from Eldridge and Thomas (1957) as part of the empirical
speciﬁcations that follow do not alter the results.
49An additional measure of industrialization that can be considered is the ratio of the value of capital (from
Easterlin, 1957) to the value of farm land (from the U.S. Census in relevant years). This ratio goes from an
average in the U.S. of 0.33 in 1880 to 3.44 in 1920, with considerable variation across states. Inclusion of this
measure in place of or in addition to the urban percentage does not alter any of the empirical results that follow.
50This speciﬁcation assures that the explanatory variables are indeed independent of the dependent variable. It
can be justiﬁed by the existence of a lag between the current economic conditions and their eﬀect on the political
29We allow for a time invariant unobserved heterogeneity across states in the level of the log
expenditure per child, ηi, and a linear unobserved heterogeneity across states in the time trend
of the log expenditure per child, θit.N a m e l y ,
vit = ηi + θit + εit. (40)
First diﬀerencing (39), utilizing (40) it follows that51
∆lneit = β1∆Gi,t−1 + β2∆lnyi,t−1 + β3∆Ui,t−1 + β4∆Bi,t−1 + θi + ∆εit, (41)
where ∆lneit ≡ lneit+1 − lneit (i.e. the diﬀerence in the log expenditure per child in state i
between 1920 and 1900, and between 1950 and 1920), and ∆Gi,t−1 ≡ Gi,t − Gi,t−1 (i.e., the
diﬀerence in the Gini coeﬃc i e n to fi n e q u a l i t yi nl a n do w n e r s h i pi ns t a t ei between 1900 and 1880,
and between 1920 and 1900). The lag operator is similarly deﬁned for the rest of the explanatory
variables.
Given the empirical speciﬁcation (41) and our set of data, we have two possible observations
for each state. Due to limitations in the data we have 79 total observations over 41 states, with
3 states having only one period of observation for the dependent variable (1920 − 1950).
The negative correlation between the changes in the log of education expenditure in state
i, ∆lneit, and the changes in the lagged Gini coeﬃc i e n to fi n e q u a l i t yi nl a n do w n e r s h i pi ns t a t e
i, ∆Gi,t−1, is apparent in Figure 3, and is demonstrated by the ﬁtted values plotted from an OLS
regression.
Table 1 depicts the correlation between all variables utilized in the empirical speciﬁcations.
In particular, the correlation coeﬃcient between ∆lneit and ∆Gi,t−1,i sd e p i c t e di nF i g u r e3 .
The table indicates that changes in the Gini coeﬃcient are closely related to changes in the
black population in the same periods, as well as to changes in education expenditures per child
in the next periods. There appears to be no signiﬁcant relationship between changes in the
Gini and changes in income per capita or urbanization. The changes in the percent of the
black population is positively associated with changes in the Gini coeﬃcient and negatively with
changes in education expenditures and income per capita. The correlation with a change of a
measure of income inequality ∆ai,t−1 will be discussed later.
To undertake more rigorous empirical testing, we begin by assuming that E(∆εit)=0and
E(∆εit∆X)=0 ,w h e r eX ≡ (Gi,t−1,lnyi,t−1,U i,t−1,B i,t−1). In other words, we presume that the
changes in explanatory variables are not correlated with changes in the error term, even though
structure and the implementation of educational policy.
51An alternate speciﬁcation would examine the change in the log of total expenditure (∆lnEit)a so p p o s e dt o
the change in the log of expenditure per child (∆lneit). This would eliminate any concern that expenditures
per child were changing due to random ﬂuctuations in the size of the population. Regressions using ∆lnEit as
the dependent variable, (including in some speciﬁcations of the change in the size of the log of child population
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Figure 3: The Correlation of Changes in Education Expenditure and Changes in Land Inequality
Table 1: Correlations of Variables
∆lneit ∆Gi,t−1 ∆lnyi,t−1 ∆Ui,t−1 ∆Bi,t−1 ∆ai,t−1
∆lneit 1.00
∆Gi,t−1 −0.31∗∗ 1.00
∆lnyi,t−1 0.42∗∗ −0.16 1.00
∆Ui,t−1 −0.03 −0.05 0.13 1.00
∆Bi,t−1 −0.37∗∗ 0.23∗∗ −0.26∗∗ 0.09 1.00
∆ai,t−1 −0.18∗ 0.09 −0.06 0.11 0.25∗∗ 1.00
** indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level, * at the 10% level
the levels of the explanatory variables might be correlated with the error term itself in (39).
In addition, we begin by assuming that the time trend parameter, θi, is identical across states.
Under these assumptions the speciﬁcation in (41) can be estimated by OLS, with standard errors
adjusted for clustering by state. Clustering allows for the diﬀerenced error terms for state i
(∆εit) to be correlated across diﬀerent time periods.
Table 2 depicts the results of this estimation in columns (1)−(4), establishing the negative
eﬀect of the change in the distribution of land ownership, ∆Gi,t−1 on the change in education
expenditure ∆lneit, alone and while controlling for the change in lagged income per capita,
∆lnyi,t−1, the change in the percentage of the urban population, ∆Ui,t−1, and the change in
percentage of the black population, ∆Bi,t−1. As indicated by the results in column (1) the eﬀect
of ∆Gi,t−1 alone on the change in education expenditure, ∆lneit,i sn e g a t i v ea n ds i g n i ﬁcant at
a 5% level. One would expect that changes in education expenditures would reﬂect changes in
31income per capita. Controlling for the change in lagged income per capita, ∆lnyi,t−1, in column
(2) shows that indeed an increase in lagged income per capita has a highly signiﬁcant positive
eﬀect on education expenditure. Nevertheless, the negative eﬀect of ∆Gi,t−1 on the change in
education expenditure, ∆lneit, remains stable and is highly signiﬁcant. Column (3) adds an
additional control for the change in the percentage of the urban population, ∆Ui,t−1, capturing
a potential adverse eﬀect of urbanization on education expenditure due to economies of scale
in education, and its positive eﬀect steaming from the correlation between industrialization and
urbanization. The eﬀect of the changes in urbanization on changes in education expenditure is
negative but insigniﬁcant. The negative eﬀect of ∆Gi,t−1 on the change in education expenditure,
remains stable and highly signiﬁcant. Finally, column (4) includes a control for the change
in percentage of the black population to ensure that the adverse eﬀect of land inequality on
educational expenditure does not reﬂe c tt h ea d v e r s ee ﬀect of the discrimination in the South
(where land inequality is more pronounced), on educational expenditure. As expected the eﬀect
of the change in the percentage of the black population on the change in educational expenditure
is negative and signiﬁcant. Nevertheless, the eﬀect of the change in the distribution of land
ownership remains signiﬁcant. The size of the point estimate for ∆Gi,t−1 is very stable over
the ﬁrst three speciﬁcations, indicating that a one standard deviation decline in ∆Gi,t−1 would
have increased expenditure per child at the end of the following period by 17-18%. In the fourth
speciﬁcation the eﬀect is 13%.
As an alternate speciﬁcation, we reestimate equation (41) using ﬁxed eﬀects, allowing
for θi to vary by state. The results of this speciﬁcation is found in column (5) in Table 2,
where all control variables are included. In comparison to column (4) the point estimate on the
Gini coeﬃcient has slightly fallen, but it remains signiﬁcant. The size of the coeﬃcient on the
percentage black has decreased as well. The results in column (5) may seem to indicate that
there is some state-speciﬁc time trend and that previously the change in the Gini coeﬃcient was
proxying for this state-speciﬁce ﬀect.52
However, a Hausman test suggests that the OLS speciﬁcation in column (4) is preferred
to the FE speciﬁcation in column (5). The results of this test are found in column (5).T h e
extremely low value for the Hausman statistic provides strong evidence that the OLS speciﬁcation
does not diﬀer systematically from the FE estimates, and is therefore the preferred speciﬁcation
due to its better eﬃciency properties.
Consider the diﬀerence between a drop in the Gini coeﬃcient of -0.018 (that occurred in
52An additional issue is the possibility of serial correlation in the diﬀerenced error term, ∆vit, which is assumed
to be zero. Following Wooldridge (2002, p. 283), we regress ∆ˆ vit on ∆ˆ vit−1, (i.e., the residuals on their lags,
as obtained from the OLS regressions). The estimated relationship is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in any
speciﬁcation, however the estimate is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from -0.5, which would hold if the vit were perfectly
uncorrelated. If we allow for ∆vit to follow an AR(1) process, the results do not diﬀer appreciably from those
presented in table 2.
32Table 2: Speciﬁcations for Changes in Per Child Education Expenditure
Dep. Variable: Change in log expend per child (∆lneit)
Exp. Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆Gi,t−1
(a) -1.72** -1.75*** -1.77*** -1.33*** -1.19**
(0.72) (0.58) (0.62) (0.54) (0.62)
∆lnyi,t−1 1.27*** 1.31*** 1.10*** 1.32***
(0.21) (0.20) (0.16) (0.47)




Constant 0.69 1.10 0.78 0.69 0.55
(0.05) (0.08) (0.13) (0.10) (0.16)
Hausman statistic(b) 1.29
Hausman p-value 0.86
R2 0.12 0.37 0.38 0.54
Observations 79 79 79 79 79
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS FE
S.E. Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Standard
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
a) A one-sided test that the coeﬃcient on ∆Gi,t−1 is less than zero is performed
*** indicates signiﬁc a n c ea t1 %l e v e l ,* *a tt h e5 %l e v e l ,*a tt h e1 0 %l e v e l
b) Hausman statistic is distributed χ2 (4) in column 5
33Florida - at the 25th percentile of ∆Gi,t−1 across states - between 1900 to 1920), and an increase
in the Gini coeﬃcient of 0.102 (that took place in Wyoming - at the 75th percentile of ∆Gi,t−1
across states - between 1900 and 1920). Using the estimates in column (4), the total growth in
education expenditures in Florida was 17% higher between 1920 and 1950 than in Wyoming.
The period between 1900 and 1950 is an excellent example of the kind of education reform
that the theory proposes, as capital accumulation eventually drives up the incentives to provide
secondary education for the modern sector. The prediction of the theory that inequality in the
distribution of land ownership would slow down this process is found to have strong support in
the data from this period. The results in Table 2 show a robust adverse eﬀect of land inequality
on education expenditures per child.
6.4 Land versus Income Inequality
A potential concern may be that the measure of land inequality, the farm size Gini index, is
simply a proxy for income inequality or wealth inequality. Goldin and Katz (1997) suggest that
income inequality is associated with poor education outcomes across states during the U.S. high
school movement. They reach this conclusion using a rough proxy for the distribution of income
in a state: the number of automobile registrations per person.
Goldin and Katz (1997) exploit the signiﬁcant diﬀerences in high school graduation and
attendance rates across states in order to examine the factors that were associated with high
levels of secondary education. They ﬁnd that states in the US that were leaders in secondary
education had high and equally distributed income and wealth, and that homogeneity of economic
and social conditions were conducive to the establishment of secondary education.
The data on motor vehicle registrations by state is available from the U.S. Department of
Transportation, that provides this data as far back as 1900. Using this data we are able to create
measures of automobile registrations per capita by state for the years 1900, 1920, and 1950. The
number of registrations per person in 1880 is obviously equal to zero for all states. On average,
there is about one automobile per thousand people in 1900, climbing to 80 per thousand in 1920
and 271 per thousand in 1950. In 1900, the number of automobiles varies from only one per ten
thousand people in Mississippi to about ﬁve per thousand in California. Mississippi again lags
the nation in 1950, with only 151 cars per thousand person, while the leader is again California
with 374 autos per thousand.
Figure 4 plots the change in the inequality in land ownership as measured by the Gini
coeﬃcient against the change in automobiles per capita between the years 1900 and 1920. There is
no discernible relationship between the two measures. The correlation between the two measures
is 0.18 and insigniﬁcant. If we compare the change in Gini and the change in automobiles per
capita between the years 1920 and 1950 the correlation is 0.11 and insigniﬁcant as well.
34Table 3: Speciﬁcations including Changes in Auto Registrations
Dep. Variable: Change in log exp per child (∆lneit)
Exp. Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆Gi,t−1
(a) -1.72** -1.67** -1.71*** -1.74*** -1.32*** -1.18**
(0.72) (0.73) (0.58) (0.62) (0.54) (0.62)
∆ai,t−1 -0.08** -0.07** -0.06** -0.05* -0.01 -0.02
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
∆lnyi,t−1 1.26*** 1.30*** 1.10*** 1.34***
(0.22) (0.21) (0.16) (0.48)




Constant 0.69 1.03 1.10 0.70 0.77 0.69 0.54
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.13) (0.10) (0.17)
Hausman statistic(b) 1.62
Hausman p-value 0.90
R2 0.12 0.02 0.13 0.38 0.39 0.54
Observations 79 79 79 79 79 79 79
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FE
S.E. Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Standard
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
a) A one-sided test that the coeﬃcient on ∆Gi,t−1 is less than zero is performed
*** indicates signiﬁcance at 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level
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Figure 4: Comparison of Changes in Inequality Measures, 1900-1920
To incorporate this approximation of income inequality into our speciﬁcations we include
the lagged number of automobiles per capita relative to the national average in the relevant year,
denoted ai,t−1.53 After ﬁrst diﬀerencing, ∆ai,t−1 is included in in the right hand size of the
speciﬁcation in (41). The correlation of this measure with the other regressors can be found in
table 1.
The results of the regressions can be found in Table 3, which are OLS speciﬁcations with
clustered standard errors in columns (1) − (6).C o l u m n (1) shows the basic regression of the
change in education on ∆Gi,t−1, for comparison purposes. Column (2) uses only changes in autos
per capita as a control variable, and while it is signiﬁcantly related to the growth in education
expenditures in the following period, it is negatively related.54 This implies that growth in
autos per capita relative to the national average — an indicator for decreasing income inequality
— was actually associated with falling education expenditures. Notice as well, that changes
in land inequality are capable of explaining 12% of the total variation in growth of education
53This usage diﬀers slightly from Goldin and Katz, who use the level of autos per capita in a regression on the
level of expenditures. We use the relative value of autos per capita since the variations in actual autos per capita
over time is so large that it overwhelms the variation in autos per capita across states within any given period.
If we do not use relative values, then the ﬁrst diﬀerence in autos per capita looks very similar across states in a
given year, giving autos per capita less of an opportunity to explain the variation in education expenditure growth.
By using relative values we increase the variation in autos per capita growth across states, and we increase the
possibility that this will dominate the eﬀect of the Land Gini coeﬃcient. Using the actual level of autos per capita
does not materially impact the results.
54The sign on autos per capita is the opposite of what Goldin and Katz (1997) ﬁnd in their analysis of education
expenditures across states. The diﬀerence arises from the fact that we are using diﬀerences in autos per capita, as
opposed to levels, and from the fact that we examine the changes over a longer period of time while GK focused
on a single year of cross-sectional data.
36expenditures, the relative number of automobiles per capita explains only 2% of total variation.
Combining the two, column (3) includes the change in the Gini and the change in rela-
tive autos per capita as controls. In this case, the inverse relationship of education with land
inequality remains highly signiﬁcant, and the size of the coeﬃc i e n ti sa l m o s ti d e n t i c a lt oi t ss i z e
if relative autos per capita is excluded. The estimate for relative autos per capita is signiﬁcant,
but again is negative. The R-squared does not increase appreciably, either, when relative autos
per capita are added to the speciﬁcation, indicating its limited ability to explain the variation in
the growth of education expenditure.
In column (4) we include the measure of income per capita and ﬁnd that the size of the
coeﬃcient on the change in Gini does not change, while the one-sided t-tests again shows a very
signiﬁcant result. The coeﬃcient on relative autos per capita is again negative, with decreased
signiﬁcance. The regression in column (5) includes urbanization and the results are nearly
identical. Column (6) includes the changes in the percentage of the black population, and
although the point estimate for the change in the Gini falls (as was the case in the regressions
that did not include relative autos per capita) it remains highly signiﬁcant. The estimated eﬀect
of autos per capita is still negative and insigniﬁcant.
The ﬁnal column of table 3 performs a ﬁxed eﬀects regression using all the explanatory
variables. As before, the FE speciﬁcation shows a smaller but signiﬁcant point estimate for the
Gini coeﬃcient, whereas the eﬀect of the relative number of autos per capita remains insigniﬁcant.
However, a Hausman test provides support for using the OLS estimates due to their better
eﬃciency.
Overall, the results obtained from including the relative number of autos per capita as
a control for income inequality are almost identical to those when autos are excluded. A one
standard deviation drop in the change of the Gini coeﬃcient is still associated with at least a 13%
increase in education expenditures per child in the following period. Given that the inclusion
of a proxy for income inequality produced almost no change in the point estimates for the Gini
coeﬃcient, it appears that our empirical analysis is not simply confounding the eﬀects of land and
income inequality. However, as the number of automobiles per capita is not an ideal measure, it
would be desirable to examine the results with better data on income equality if it would become
available.
7C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The proposed theory suggests that the concentration of land ownership has been a major hurdle
in the emergence of human capital promoting institutions and economic growth. The rise in
the demand for human capital in the in the process of industrialization and its eﬀect on human
capital formation and on the onset of the demographic transition have been the prime forces in
37the transition from stagnation to growth. As the demand for human capital emerged, diﬀerences
concentration of land ownership across countries generated variations in the extensiveness of
human capital formation and therefore in the rapidity of technological progress and the timing of
the demographic transition, contributing to the emergence of the great divergence in income per
capita across countries. Land abundance, which was beneﬁcial in early stages of development,
generated in later stages a hurdle for human capital accumulation and economic growth among
countries in which land ownership was unequally distributed, bringing about changes in the
ranking of countries in the world income distribution.
The central hypothesis of this research that land inequality adversely aﬀected the timing of
education reform is examined and conﬁrmed empirically, utilizing variations in the distribution
of land ownership and educational expenditure across states in the US during the high school
movement. Furthermore, historical evidence suggests that consistent with the proposed hypoth-
esis, land reforms in Japan, Korea, Russia, and Taiwan were followed by signiﬁcant education
reforms, and that variations in distribution of land ownership across and within North and South
America have been a signiﬁcant force in the emergence of sustained diﬀerences in human capital
formation and economic growth.
The paper implies that diﬀerences in the evolution of social structures across countries
may reﬂect diﬀerences in the distribution of land ownership. In particular, the dichotomy be-
tween workers and capitalists is more likely to persist in land abundant economies in which land
ownership is unequally distributed. As argued by Galor and Moav (2006), due to the comple-
mentarity between physical and human capital in production, the Capitalists were among the
prime beneﬁciaries of the accumulation of human capital by the masses. They had therefore the
incentive to ﬁnancially support public education that would sustain their proﬁt rates and would
improve their economic well being, although would ultimately undermine their dynasty’s position
in the social ladder and would bring about the demise of the capitalist-workers class structure.
As implied by the current research, the timing and the degree of this social transformation de-
pend on the economic interest of landlords. In contrast to the Marxian hypothesis, this paper
suggests that workers and capitalists are the natural economic allies that share an interest in
industrial development and therefore in the implementation of growth enhancing human capital
promoting institutions, whereas landlords are the prime hurdle for industrial development and
social mobility.
38Appendix 1- Landowners Preferred Tax Rate for the case of a Cobb-Douglas
Agricultural Technology
Lemma 3 The elasticity of θt with respect to yM
t , eθt,yM
t ∈ (0,1).
Proof. Suppose not. Suppose that eθt,yM
t ≤ 0. Since wt =( 1− α)yM
t /θt ar i s ei nyM
t and
ad e c l i n ei nθt imply a rise in w and a reduction in the optimal number of workers in agriculture
and hence a rise in θt. A contradiction. Suppose that eθt,yM
t ≥ 1. since wt =( 1− α)yM
t /θt ar i s e
in yM
t and a more than proportional rise in θt implies a decline in wt and a rise in the optimal
number of workers in agriculture and hence a decline in θt. A contradiction. ¤
Proposition 6 If the agricultural production function is F(X,Lt)=AXγL
1−γ
t then landowners’
desirable tax rate τL
t / ∈ (0,τ∗
t).
Proof. As follows from (3), noting that Lt =1− θt,






















Let πt ≡ yM








Since the wage paid to each worker is equal in the two sectors, it follows from (42) that
(1 − γ)AXγ (1 − θt)








Note that θt is determined endogenously such that θt ∈ (0,1).
Since landlord’s income in period t is IL
t = wt +(1−τt)RtbL
t−1 +ρtX/λ, it follows that the
aggregate income of landowners, λIL
t ,i s
λIL
t = λ(1 − α)πt + sL
t αθtπt + Xρt, (47)
39where wt =( 1− α)πt, is the wage, αθtπt = αyM
t is the share of capital in the industrial output,
and sL
t is the share of capital owned by landowners. Substituting (44) and (46) into (47)
λIL
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= λ(1 − α)πt +
γ (1 − α)
(1 − γ)
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α(1−γ) landlords income is strictly increasing in πt and it follows from Lemma
3 that landowners prefer the highest possible value for yM






















α(1−γ), landowners income is a convex function of πt, implying they
prefer either the maximal or the minimal value of πt. Therefore, it follows from Lemma 3 that
landowners prefer the highest or lowest possible value for yM
t , and hence τL
t / ∈ (0,τ∗
t). ¤
40Appendix 2 - Data Sources
Education Expenditures - This is obtained from the Historical Statistics of the United States for
1920, and from the U.S. Bureau of Education, Report of the Commissioner of Education for 1900.
These expenditures are converted to 1929 dollars to match the income per capita estimates.
Expenditure per Child - The number of relevant children in a year is taken from the U.S.
Census. The available age ranges are 5-20 years in 1900 and 7-20 years in 1920. Although the
age ranges are not consistent we assume that they remain comparable over time. Furthermore,
it should be noted that since we are not comparing expenditure per child across periods these
diﬀerences in reference population are not signiﬁcant.
Income per Capita - These are estimates from Easterlini nP o p u l a t i o nR e d i s t r i b u t i o na n d
Economic Growth: United States, 1870-1950, edited by Kuznets and Thomas (1957). See their
work for descriptions of how the data is constructed. The income per capita is measured in
constant 1929 dollars.
Percent Black - This is taken from the U.S. Census for the relevant years
Percent Urban - This is taken from the U.S. Census for the relevant years. Urban is deﬁned
as any city/town with more than 4,000 people.
Year of Statehood - This is widely available information and corresponds the year each
state was oﬃcially admitted to the United States.
Gini Index of Farm Distribution - This measure was constructed for each year from farm
distribution data in the U.S. Census. For 1920, the Census reports the distribution of number of
farms and total acreage of farms by bin size. This allows for a straightforward estimate of a Gini
index. For 1900 and 1880, the Census only reports the distribution of number of farms, but not
of total acreage. In order to estimate a Gini assumptions must be made regarding the average
size of a farm within each bin. For this we used the 1920 data as a guide. In most cases the
average farm size is very close to the average expected if the farms were distributed uniformly
over the bin (for example, the average farm size in 1920 in the 20-50 acre bin is close to 35 acres).
Therefore, in 1880 and 1900 we use the average size expected in each bin as the actual average
size in each bin. The only remaining complication is in the case of the bin for farms greater
than 1000 acres. We assume that the average size of farms in this bin is 1800 acres. Using this
value makes the total acreage across all bins come out very closely to the actual total acreage
of farmland reported in the Census. Due to the small number of farms in this bin, varying this
average value has almost meaningless eﬀects on the calculated Gini index.
Capital Levels - These are estimates from Easterlin in Population Redistribution and Eco-
nomic Growth: United States, 1870-1950, edited by Kuznets and Thomas (1957). See their work
for descriptions of how the data is constructed. The capital levels are measured in constant 1929
dollars.
41Value of Farm Land - This is taken from the U.S. Census for the relevant years. The
reported value of farmland is converted to 1929 dollars.
Excluded States - across the periods studied in this paper not all current U.S. states were
actually members of the union. Because of this they are lacking data in one or many of the
sources we use. Excluded for these reasons from the 1900 regressions are: Alaska, Arizona,
Hawaii, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota. Excluded from the 1920
regressions are: Alaska, Hawaii, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota.
Appendix 3 - Construction of the Gini Coeﬃcient
This measure was constructed for each year from farm distribution data in the U.S. Census.
For 1920 and 1950, the Census reports the distribution of number of farms and total acreage of
farms by bin size. This allows for a straightforward estimate of a Gini index for those years.
For 1900 and 1880, the Census only reports the distribution of number of farms, but not of total
acreage. In order to estimate a Gini assumptions must be made regarding the average size of a
farm within each bin. For this we used the 1920 data as a guide. In most cases the average farm
size is very close to the average expected if the farms were distributed uniformly over the bin (for
example, the average farm size in 1920 in the 20-50 acre bin is close to 35 acres). Therefore, in
1880 and 1900 we use the average size expected in each bin as the actual average size in each bin.
The only remaining complication is in the case of the bin for farms greater than 1000 acres. We
assume that the average size of farms in this bin is 1800 acres. Using this value makes the total
acreage across all bins come out very closely to the actual total acreage of farmland reported in
the Census. Due to the small number of farms in this bin, varying this average value has almost
meaningless eﬀects on the calculated Gini index.
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